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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses empirically the impacts of public R&D grants on private R&D 
investments and on the productivity growth of the manufacturing firms in a context 
where fiscal incentives are present. Using the conditional semiparametric difference-
indifferences estimator on longitudinal data from Quebec we show that firms that use 
public grants for R&D in conjunction with tax credits for R&D perform better in terms of 
R&D input additionality than firms that use only tax credits for R&D. We then use a 
production function to assess the effectiveness of public R&D grants in the productivity 
growth of firms. We find that for each additional dollar of public R&D grant, output 
increases by 0.134 dollars. We conclude that the additional return of direct subsidies is 
positive but lower than the return on the R&D financed by own funds or R&D tax credits. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most countries now recognize the need for supporting and strengthening innovation 
activities in order to ensure productivity growth and hence long-term prosperity and 
competitiveness in the global economy. Neo-classical theory explains the need for 
government involvement in technological advance and innovation activities by the 
Arrow-Nelson rationale, which is the key argument of the neo-classical approach of 
market failure (Nelson (1959), Arrow (1962)). Essentially, the market failure approach 
point to the underinvestment from private firms in R&D leading to a supply offer of 
knowledge in the economy that is less than what would be socially desirable. In an effort 
to fill this gap, several governments implemented various incentive programs targeted to 
private firms such as fiscal-based frameworks or more direct public schemes such as 
grants, loans, procurements, venture capital investments or other instruments. 
 
In Canada, as in most OECD countries, the orientation taken in the last decades by 
governments shows a clear tendency towards fiscal incentives such as tax credits. This 
choice has been motivated mainly by the distinctive feature of tax credits of being neutral 
with respect to the choice of the industry or of projects. However, this neutrality also has 
the unattractive feature that companies tend to choose systematically the projects with the 
highest rates of return leaving so aside the least profitable projects. For this reason, it is 
not surprising that many governments spend every year, in addition to their fiscal 
incentive programmes, several millions of dollars in specific direct subsidies programmes 
to firms in order to increase private R&D spending in targeted industries or in projects 
that would not be carried out without some type of subsidy. Some authors recommend 
rather the use of both policy instruments in a more integrated approach since there is 
evidence that tax incentives stimulate mainly R&D projects that involve more applied or 
short-term research while direct subsidies affect projects which research is more basic or 
long-run (Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2000)). In any case, the question of the goal 
attainment of the objectives at which direct subsidies in a context where fiscal incentives 
are already present may be asked. In particular, this refers mainly to the two following 
questions: First, do public R&D grants result in increased R&D spending (input 
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additionality) from firms that already receive tax credits and, second, what is the impact 
of these publicly funded R&D on productivity growth? This study proposes to add to the 
evidence on this literature by exploring empirically these questions using longitudinal 
data from manufacturing firms in Quebec in the range 1997-2004.  
 
To date, these research questions have not been previously investigated with data from 
Quebec and, at the Canadian level, there are only a few studies that address the 
effectiveness of public schemes to R&D and, not surprisingly, they all focus on R&D tax 
credits given the emphasis of the Canadian government support programmes on the 
latter1. The only Canadian studies that address the effectiveness of subsidies are the 
studies by Pagé (1995) and Bérubé and Mohnen (2009), but in those cases too, the focus 
is not on the input additionality of public R&D grants nor on their impact on firms’ 
productivity, but rather on innovation output. To the benefit of this study, the 
methodological approach used by Bérubé and Mohnen (2009) has however a realistic 
feature in that, by evaluating the effectiveness of public R&D grants, it takes into account 
the effects of the other public incentives such as tax credits. The present study draws on 
this methodological approach for assessing the input additionality of public R&D grants. 
There exist a considerable body of research in other countries on the two main questions 
treated by this study but they traditionally have been treated separately, i.e. there are, on 
                                                 
1 See McFetridge, Donald G., and Jacek P. Warda, 1983. Canadian R & D incentives: Their adequacy and 
impact (Canadian Tax Foundation, Toronto, Canada)., Mansfield, Edwin , and Lorne  Switzer, 1985, 
How Effective Are Canada's Direct Tax Incentives for R and D?, Canadian Public Policy 11, 241-246.a, 
Mansfield, Edwin, and Lorne Switzer, 1985, The effects of R&D tax credits and allowances in Canada, 
Research Policy 14, 97-107.b, Bernstein, I. Jeffrey, 1986, The Effect of Direct and Indirect Tax 
Incentives on Canadian Industrial R&D Expenditures, Canadian Public Policy 12, 438-448., Lebeau, 
Daniel, 1996, Les mesures d’aide fiscale à la R-D et les entreprises québécoises, in Conseil de la science 
et de la technologie du Québec, ed.: L' Efficacite des mesures d'aide fiscale à la R-D des entreprises du 
Canada et du Québec (Gouvernement du Québec, Sainte-Foy, Québec)., Dagenais, Marcel, Pierre 
Mohnen, and Pierre Therrien, 2004, Les firmes canadiennes repondent-elles aux incitations fiscales a la 
recherche-developpement?, L'Actualite Economique/Revue D'Analyse Economique 80, 175-205., Dahlby, 
Bev 2005, A Framework for Evaluating Provincial R&D Tax Subsidies, Canadian Public Policy 31, 45-
58., Hanel, Petr , Dirk  Czarnitzki, and Julio Miguel  Rosa, 2005, Evaluating the Impact of R&D Tax 
Credits on Innovation: A Microeconometric Study on Canadian Firms, in ZEW discussion paper 04-77, 
ed.: ZEW (Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim)., Baghana, Rufin, and Pierre 
Mohnen, 2009, Effectiveness of R&D tax incentives in small and large enterprises in Québec, Small 
Business Economics 33, 91-107. and Baghana, Rufin, 2008, Une évaluation de l'impact du programme 
québécois de superdéductions à la R-D, in Institut de la Statistique du Québec, ed.: Compendium 
d'indicateurs de l'activité scientifique et technologique au Québec. Édition 2008 (Institut de la Statistique 
du Québec, Quebec). 
 4 
the one hand, studies that address the question of the additionality of public subsidies and 
in most cases they did not take into account the effects of tax credits in country with both 
type of government incentives. The evidence from these studies is mixed and this casts 
doubt on the question whether public subsidies increase firms’ private spending in R&D 
or to the contrary, crowds out this spending. Klette, Moen and Griliches (2000) or David, 
Hall and Toole (2000) provide good reviews of these studies. On the other hand, there are 
studies that analyze the impact of firms’ total R&D spending (privately and publicly 
funded) on productivity growth. Most of them estimate an elasticity of the output with 
respect to the R&D effort or a rate of return to firms’ R&D expenditures. In the latter 
case, on which this study focuses, empirical estimates of the rate of return vary between 
20% and 50%. Examples include Griliches and Mairesse (1991), Wakelin (2001), Smith, 
Dilling-Hansen, Eriksson and Madsen (2004) and Maté-Garcia and Rodriguez-Fernandez 
(2008). 
 
The novel aspect of this study is that it combines the two research questions into one 
analysis by taking advantage of a set of rich microdata from manufacturing firms in 
Quebec. More specifically, to answer the first question we use a semiparametric matching 
estimator, more specifically the conditional semiparametric difference-in-differences 
estimator and, following Bérubé and Mohnen (2009), we focus on the comparison 
between the intensity of R&D of firms that receive R&D grants in addition to R&D tax 
credits and the intensity of R&D of firms that receive only R&D tax credits. Hence, the 
estimated differences in the intensity of R&D of both groups permit to assess the input 
additionality of R&D grants in the presence of tax credits. For the second question, we 
subsequently use these estimated differences in a production function controlling also for 
other variables in order to evaluate the impact of R&D grants to firm’s growth 
productivity. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 provides an overview of the R&D tax 
incentives in Quebec. Section 2 sketches the methodological approach which is 
undertaken in two steps: The first step regarding the matching estimator framework from 
which we shall assess the input additionality of R&D grants and the second step 
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regarding the production function framework from which we shall assess the impact of 
privately and publicly funded R&D on productivity growth. In section 3, we first describe 
briefly the three data sources used and the merging process of these data before 
explaining variables construction. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and the 
results. Section 5 concludes after a discussion. 
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1. PUBLIC DIRECT SUBSIDIES TOWARD R&D IN QUEBEC 
Over the last thirty years, most of the governmental financial assistance to R&D activities 
in Quebec from both the government of Quebec (the provincial government) and the 
Canadian government (the federal government), has been granted to firms in the form of 
fiscal incentives through Quebec’s and federal scientific research and experimental 
development (SR&ED) programmes and this has resulted in a significant decrease in the 
amounts of grants awarded annually to firms. However, both governments maintained 
through years a few direct funding programmes to R&D in addition to their SR&ED 
programmes. At the provincial level there is no agency dedicated to the management of 
public funding programmes. Financial assistance is attributed to firms by the ministries 
and some government agencies. In most cases, the assistance from these institutions is 
granted for R&D expenditures that do not entitle firms to claim tax credits from SR&ED. 
The Ministry of Economic Development Innovation and Export Trade (MDEIE2) is the 
main provincial institution for public direct funding to firms3. In addition to the grants 
from the government of Quebec, firms can also apply for federal grants through the 
Industrial Research Assistance Program (NRC-IRAP) which is the most important federal 
programme administered by National Research Council of Canada. Firms may also 
benefit from grants or contracts programmes from other federal agencies acting in 
specific areas such as energy or military (e.g. Mines and Resources Grants, Canadian 
Space Agency Grants, Defence Industry Productivity Program). 
 
Table 1-1 shows the evolution in the period 1997-2004 of R&D grants and contracts 
from both the Canadian federal government and the Government of Quebec to 
manufacturing firms performing R&D activities. The overall value of grants and 
contracts dropped from CAN 100 M$ to only CAN 7 M$ in 2004 and this fall originates 
essentially in a reduction of grants and contracts from the Canadian government between 
1997 and 2001. Such a fall points out to policies adopted by the federal and provincial 
                                                 
2 MDEIE: Ministère du Développement économique, de l'Innovation et de l'Exportation. 
3 This role was previously played by the ministère de l'Industrie et du Commerce (MIC) and the ministère 
de la Recherche, de la Science et de la Technologie (MRST) which were merged in 2003 to form the 
ministère du Développement économique et régional et de la Recherche. The latter was replaced in turn 
by the MDEIE from 2006.  
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governments in Canada in the last years and reflects the preference over time by both 
levels of government for fiscal incentives policy over R&D grants incentives. This is 
illustrated clearly by observing the evolution of the ratio of the combined federal-
provincial R&D grants and contracts to the combined federal-provincial tax credits 
received by firms in this period as indicated in the last line of Table 1-1. From more than 
46 % in 1997, this ratio is no longer more than 2.2 % in 2004. 
 
Table 1-1: Comparative evolution of public direct incentives and tax credits aimed at 
R&D in the manufacturing sector in Quebec, 1997-2004 
 Millions of Canadian dollars 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Provincial and federal 
R&D grants          
⎯ Provincial  3 4 2 3 5 11 4 4 
⎯ Federal  97 36 30 20 5 5 3 3 
Total R&D grants 100 40 32 23 10 16 7 7 
   
R&D grants / Tax credits 46.3% 16.7% 13.7% 5.5% 3.1% 4.6% 2.1% 2.2% 
Sources:  Ministry of Revenue of Quebec and Statistics Canada, calculations by the author 
Note: Calculations in this table have been done from the data of the survey on Research and 
Development in Canadian Industry (RDCI) linked to the administrative data from the 
Ministry of Revenue of Quebec. Firms that could not be matched in both samples were 
discarded. These firms represent about 9.5 % of the total number of firms.  
 
Table 1-2 and Table 1-3 summarize the use of the public grants by class size and by 
technology level. Table 1-2 reveals an asymmetric distribution of R&D grants between 
large and small firms. Indeed, more than 87 % of R&D recipients are small firms (less 
than 250 employees) with only 12.9 % of the total value of attributed R&D grants. 
However, 82.8 % of the total amount of attributed R&D grants goes to the largest firms 
(more than 500 employees) present in the sample in the proportion of only 8.6 %. The 
pattern of this asymmetric distribution is also comparable to that of the use of tax credits 
by firms in the manufacturing sector as stated by Baghana and Mohnen (2009) and refers 
to questions concerning firms accessibility to public funding. When questioned about this 
issue, most companies’ administrators of the small enterprises invoke reasons such as the 
complexity of the application procedure of the government programmes, the lack of time 
 8 
and human resources necessary to follow up technological activities, and the high 
consultancy that exceed in some cases the benefits of the programme, etc. 
 
Table 1-2: Use of public grants by class size in the manufacturing sector, 1997-2004 
 
 
% Grants  Value of grants 
 
Ratio grants /tax 
n % Québec  % federal  Total % 
≥ 500 employees  8.6 43.2 89.9 82.8 17.2 
250 to 499 employees 4.2 11.5 3.0 4.3 4.9 
50 to 249 employees 28.5 29.6 3.8 7.7 3.2 
< 50 employees 58.7 15.7 3.3 5.2 2.3 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 9.6 
Sources: Ministry of Revenue of Quebec and Statistics Canada, compiled by the Institut de la 
Statistique du Québec and by the author 
 
Turning now to the distribution of R&D grants by technology group in the manufacturing 
sector, it can be stated in Table 1-3 that, more than 74.4 % of the firms in the sample are 
in groups other than the high technology group making up only 15.1 % of the total value 
of attributed R&D grants. However, the high technology group which represents 25.6 % 
of the total number of R&D grants recipients gets almost 85.0 % of the total amount of 
attributed R&D grants. Clearly, these differences suggest that most federal and provincial 
direct support programmes are used by the high technology group which is R&D-
intensive. 
 
Table 1-3: Use of public grants by technology level4, 1997-2004 
 
 
% Grants  Value of grants 
 
Ratio grants /tax 
n % Québec  % federal  Total % 
High-technology  25.6 41.6 92.8 84.9  16.5 
Medium-high-technology 30.7 21.0 4.9 7.4  4.6 
Medium-low-technology 34.5 35.3 1.9 7.0  2.3 
Low-technology 9.2 2.1 0.4 0.7  1.2
TOTAL 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  9.6 
Sources: Ministry of Revenue of Quebec and Statistics Canada, compiled by the Institut de la 
Statistique du Québec and by the author 
 
                                                 
4 Based on OECD classification of manufacturing industries using International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC) rev.3 activity breakdown (see classification in Table D-4)  
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2. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
The methodology comprises two steps, each investigating one of the two main research 
questions of this study, i.e. whether public R&D grants result in increased R&D spending 
from firms (input additionality), and what is the impact of privately and publicly funded 
R&D on productivity growth. In the first step, input additionality is evaluated by 
computing an overall average effect on knowledge capital using the individual effects for 
each recipient firm estimated by the semiparametric matching estimator. The estimated 
individual effects are then subtracted from firm’s knowledge capital in order to isolate, on 
the one hand, the knowledge capital induced by R&D expenditures funded out of firms’ 
own pockets and by R&D tax credits and, on the other hand, the knowledge capital 
induced by R&D expenditures funded by public grants. In the second step, a productivity 
growth function is estimated and the two knowledge capital components from the first 
step are included along with other variables as regressors in the estimation. This two-step 
approach has been previously used by Czarnitzki and Licht (2006). However, our study is 
departing from theirs by the matching scheme used. Furthermore, their study is based on 
a different specification for the production function as it focuses on innovation output. 
Indeed, they introduce the two knowledge capital components resulting from the 
matching process as innovation input in a Griliches invention production function linking 
innovation output to innovation input. The focus of this study is rather on the growth 
productivity of firms. 
 
Before describing in detail the matching estimator and the production function 
frameworks used respectively in the first and second step of the methodological 
approach, let’s first present formally this two-step approach. As starting point, consider a 
prototypical model of economic choice. Let 0iY  and 
1
iY  denote two potential outcomes of 
the firm i  respectively with treatment and without treatment, that is, in our case, the 
outcome of firm i if it claims only tax credits and its outcome when it receives both tax 
credits and R&D grants. { }1,0=giT , is the indictor of exposure to treatment that takes the 
value 1 if the firm is treated and 0 otherwise. We can write the following: 
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where iτ is the impact or the effect of the treatment to be estimated. The aggregation of 
these individual effects yields the widely known ATT (average treatment effect on the 
treated). For the estimation of this effect, we adopt the approach of the matching 
estimator. The advantage of using the matching estimator is that it allows )(Xh to have 
unknown functional form rather than being, for instance, a linear combination of X such 
as in the case of parametric sample selection models. 
 
For a firm i, the gain from treatment is given by: 
iii τYY =− 01  ( 2-2 )
 
In the second step, a productivity function Q  is estimated using the following regressors: 
i
1
i
0
i YY τ−= , i.e. the knowledge capital, taken as R&D intensity, induced by private 
R&D expenditures and by R&D tax credits, iτ , the knowledge capital induced by R&D 
expenditures funded by public grants and others variables iZ affecting productivity. This 
relationship is given by: 
),,( 0 iiii ZYfQ τ=  ( 2-3 )
 
2.1. Step 1: The matching estimator framework 
2.1.1. The fundamental evaluation problem and the selection bias problem 
The estimation of equation ( 2-2 ) is not straightforward because only one of the two 
possible outcomes is observed at the same time i.e. 0iY  or 
1
iY . In other 
words, 0igi
1
igi Y)T1(YTY −+= . This is known in the literature as the fundamental 
evaluation problem. 
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In order to solve this issue, treatment impacts measures are approximated by means 
impacts. Hence, equation ( 2-2 ) is rewritten as the average treatment effect on the treated 
firms (ATT) and is given by: 
)X,1TY(E)X,1TY(EATT g
0
g
1 =−==  ( 2-4 )
where X is a set of comparable characteristics. If the mean )X,1TY(E g
1 = is known, it is 
not the case for )X,1TY(E g
0 =  the no-treatment outcome of programme participants. 
This unknown outcome may be approximated by the outcome of the nonparticipants 
)X,0TY(E g
0 = if such information is available. However, another important issue arises 
when using this approximation. Indeed, unless the case of randomly selected firms, the 
outcome of treated firms in case of non-treatment is expected to differ from the outcome 
of nonparticipants i.e. )X,0TY(E)X,1TY(E g
0
g
0 =≠= . As a consequence, equation 
( 2-4 ) using such an approximation can possibly be biased. This problem is known as the 
selection bias. Several models in the statistics and econometrics literature propose 
identifying assumptions to estimate )X,1TY(E g
0 =  i.e. what programme participants 
would experience had they not participated. 
 
2.1.2. The matching methods  
To address the fundamental evaluation problem and the selection bias problem, different 
models referred to as models of economic choice have been proposed, among them are 
the matching estimators. Matching is based, as stated by Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 
(1997), on the intuitively attractive idea of contrasting the outcomes of programme 
participants with the outcomes of “comparable” nonparticipants. There are two 
approaches to matching, first, the parametric matching approach and, second, the non 
parametric approach to matching. While in the former approach one needs to estimate 
consistently the two counterfactuals’ situations by assuming specific functional forms, 
the latter approach, which is used in this study, has the advantage of not requiring doing 
so.  
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From the introduction of the hypothesis of conditional independence assumption (CIA) 
by Rubin (1977), non parametric matching methods have been improved and became one 
of the most important models used in the evaluation literature especially in the labor 
market area. The CIA states that for individuals with the same set of exogenous 
characteristics V, the participation and the potential outcome are independent. When this 
condition is satisfied, the selection bias is eliminated and the outcome of treated firms in 
case of non-treatment equals the outcome of nonparticipants that is, 
)X,0TY(E)X,1TY(E g
0
g
0 === . The CIA is expressed as follows: 
VTYY g⊥),( 01  ( 2-5 )
where V is the multidimensional vector of pre-treatment characteristics. This condition 
states the independence of outcomes )Y,Y( 01 from the treatment variables given a set of 
conditioning variables V. We recall that the vector V is formed of observable variables X 
that affect the outcomes of other observable variables Z determining choices. However, 
the non-parametric matching methods do not make any distinction between the X and Z 
variables. 
 
In order to control for the multidimensional problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
introduced in their seminal paper the method of propensity score matching. Propensity 
score is defined as the probability that a treatment was assigned to a unit given 
information in the control variables. In other words, it is the probability that an individual 
takes treatment. Matching on the propensity is a useful alternative because it reduces the 
multidimensional problem to one dimension. Formally, the propensity score is given by: 
 
{ } { }VTEVTVp gg === 1Pr)(  ( 2-6 )
 
To derive this equation, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) assume the following: 
 
Lemma 1: Balancing of pre-treatment variables given the propensity score. If p(V) is the 
propensity score, then 
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)(( VpVTg ⊥  ( 2-7 )
 
Lemma 2: Unconfoundedness given the propensity score. Suppose that assignment to 
treatment is unconfounded, i.e. 
VTYY g⊥),( 01  ( 2-8 )
 
Then under ( 2-7 ) and ( 2-8 ) it can be showed that assignment to treatment is 
unconfounded given the propensity score, i.e. 
)(),( 01 VpTYY g⊥  ( 2-9 )
 
The propensity score )(Vp  can be estimated using any standard probability model. Many 
matching estimators based on propensity score have been developed for the estimation of 
the average effect of treatment (ATT), which is the most used evaluation parameter. A 
generalized form for the ATT may be written as follows: 
∑ ∑
=∈ =∈
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=τ
)1Tg(i )0Tg(j
0
jij
1
i
1
ATT YwYN
1  ( 2-10 )
where ijw  is a weight that is function of the propensity score )(Vp . This weight function 
gives higher weights to nonparticipants j with propensity score closer to that of the 
participant i and a lower weight to nonparticipants j with distant propensity score. Hence, 
for all i, 1
)0(
1 =∑
=∈
=
Tgj
ijw . In this setting, the treated are matched with a weighted average of 
all controls with weights that are inversely proportional to the distance between the 
propensity scores of treated and controls.  
 
The most known matching estimators are Nearest neighbor matching, Radius matching 
estimator (Cochran and Rubin (1973)), Kernel matching and Local linear regression 
matching estimator. These estimators differ from each other by the weights they attach to 
individuals of the comparison group. A good review of matching estimators can be found 
in Smith and Todd (2003). 
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These traditional cross-section matching estimators however have been criticized since 
they do not allow controlling for the potential bias that may arise from unobservable time 
trends which are common across treatment and comparison groups. Indeed, if the 
outcome variable change over time due to reasons unrelated to the participation decision, 
these estimators will be biased. Various alternate estimators have been proposed to 
eliminate this potential bias and one of the most compelling estimators is the difference-
in-differences estimator (DiD) (see for example Heckman and Robb (1985)). The DiD is 
based in the simple idea of subtracting the before-after change in nonparticipant 
outcomes from the before-after change in the participant outcome. Hence, relying on the 
assumption of time-invariant linear selection, this double-difference permits to eliminate 
the bias from common time trends. Reformulating equation ( 2-10 ) accordingly, we get 
the DiD estimator : 
( )∑ ∑
=∈ =∈ ⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−−−=
)1( )0(
0
0,
0
1,
1
0,
1
1,
1
Tgi Tgj
tjtjijtitiDiD YYwYYN
τ  ( 2-11 )
 
The application of the simplest DiD estimator is based on the simple comparison of the 
outcomes of the treatment group and of the control group between pre-treatment period t0 
and post-treatment period t1. Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998) introduced an 
estimator that combines this standard DiD estimator with any of the matching estimators 
based on propensity score mentioned above, namely the conditional semiparametric 
difference-in-differences estimator (CDiD). More specifically, the CDiD estimator is 
implemented using equation ( 2-11 ), but in this case the weights ijw  are based on the 
propensity score p(V). This is the key difference and the advantage of the CDiD over the 
standard DID since, by using p(V) in equation ( 2-11 ), the CDiD allows not only 
selection on both observables and on unobservables, but it also resolves the 
multidimensional problem mentioned above. Another advantage of the CDiD matching 
estimator is that, unlike traditional cross-section matching estimators, it combines in one 
step the matching process with the estimation of the effect of the treatment. Smith and 
Todd (2005) show that the CDiD estimator is more robust than standards DiD estimators. 
The CDiD may be based on any of the various propensity matching estimators previously 
cited.  
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Following Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998), we apply in this study the CDiD 
with weights based on the local linear regression matching estimator (LLR henceforth). 
These weights are defined by Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998) as:  
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where p is the propensity score, )/)(( Njiij appGG −=  is a kernel function and Na is a 
bandwidth parameter5. Intuitively, ijw  uses all the observations in the control group and 
place higher weight on units close in terms of propensity score p and lower weights on 
more distant observations. Local linear weights are superior to any conventional kernel 
weights since local linear estimators converge at a faster rate at boundary points and 
adapt better to different data densities (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997), Fan 
(1992))6. 
 
To summarize, for the application of the CDiD estimator, we apply equation ( 2-11 ) 
using the weights defined by ( 2-12 ). For each treated firm we obtain at each period an 
estimate of the effect of the treatment ti,τ , now defined by tiDiD ,,τ  and given by: 
( ))(,,,, 0 1,0,1 1,1,,,, pwYYYYf ijtjtjtititiDiDti −−== ττ  ( 2-13 )
 
 
2.2. Step2: The production function framework 
To assess the effectiveness of the public direct support in the growth productivity of 
firms, we use a production function linking output to physical capital, to labour and to 
                                                 
5 The bandwidth parameter Na is assumed to converge toward zero as n  and Nna  converge toward 
infinity. 
6 It is worth noting that LLR matching estimator is a generalized version of the kernel matching estimator 
and both are special cases of local polynomial estimators (Cleveland, William S., 1979, Robust locally 
weighted regression and smoothing scatterplots, Journal of the American Statistical Association 74, 859-
836, Stone, Charles J., 1977, Consistent Nonparametric Regression, Annals of Statistics 5, 595-620.) 
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knowledge capital. The latter, which is our variable of interest, enters the production 
function in two separate components, that is on the one hand, the share of knowledge 
capital induced by R&D expenditures funded privately and by tax credits, and on the 
other hand, the share of knowledge capital induced by R&D expenditures funded by 
public grants. These two components are taken from the estimation of the average effect 
of treatment described in the previous section. 
 
For the production function, let’s consider a typical a Cobb-Douglas production function 
given by: 
itt eSSLKAeQ ititititit
εγγβαλ "' "'=  ( 2-14 )
where i denotes firms and t years, Q is the output, K is physical capital, L is labour , 
'S is the composite share of knowledge capital induced by R&D expenditures privately 
funded and funded by tax credits, "S is the share of knowledge capital induced by R&D 
expenditures funded by public grants, A  is a constant, λ  is a scale factor measuring the 
rate of disembodied technical change, α  is the elasticity of output with respect to 
physical capital, β  the elasticity of output with respect to labour, 'γ  the elasticity of 
output with respect to knowledge capital induced by private R&D and by tax credits, "γ  
the elasticity of output with respect to knowledge capital induced by public grants, and 
finally ε  is the error term that takes account of all the other factors such as measurement 
errors, firms technological heterogeneity and all other factors not accounted for explicitly 
in the inputs. 
 
For the estimation of equation ( 2-14 ), since in the first step of the study we used the 
R&D intensity as a proxy for the knowledge capital, equation ( 2-14 ) must be 
transformed in such a way that it includes R&D intensity in its functional form instead of 
knowledge capital. This is fulfilled by adapting to our needs the derivation proposed by 
Griliches (1973) into a labour productivity equation as follows7:  
                                                 
7 The labour productivity equation is an extended version of the Cobb-Douglas production function based 
on the proposition of Griliches, Zvi, 1973, Research expenditures and growth accounting, in B.R. 
Williams, ed.: Science and technology in economic growth (Macmillan, London). See appendix E for the 
full derivation of this equation. 
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( ) ( ) ititQRitQRititit llklq υρρθαλ +++Δ+−Δ+=−Δ "' "')()(  ( 2-15 )
where lower case letters denote the logarithms of variables. 'ρ  is the rate of return on 
R&D induced by private R&D and tax credits, and "ρ is the rate of return induced by 
public grants. In the same manner, ( )QR '  and ( )QR"  are respectively the R&D intensity 
induced by private R&D and tax credits, and by public grants. 1−+= βαθ  is the 
measure of returns to scale and, if we assume constant returns to scale, this measure 
should equal zero. However, if this measure is less than or greater than zero, then 
decreasing, respectively increasing, returns to scale prevail. 
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3. DATA AND VARIABLES  
3.1. DATA 
The data consist of a longitudinal sample of 3821 manufacturing firms over the period 
1997-2004 (11 884 observations) obtained by linking three micro data files. Such linking 
was necessary since only a part of the required information is available in each file. The 
first file is sourced from the Statistics Canada annual survey on Research and 
Development in Canadian Industry (RDCI)8 which is a census with cross sectional design 
that collects data on all Canadian firms known or believed to perform or fund R&D. In 
order to reduce the reporting burden on firms, only firms performing or funding more 
than $1 million in R&D are surveyed. For all the other firms, the data are extracted from 
administrative data from Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). For the purpose of this study, 
the main information collected from this file is the information on public subsidies. 
Indeed, the RDCI survey is the only source of information that collects information on 
the various types of government direct incentives (grants, loans, procurements, venture 
capital investments or other instruments) from both provincial governments and the 
federal government including its agencies. The second file comes from the Survey of 
Manufactures (ASM)9, conducted annually by Statistics Canada since several decades 
and its sampling frame comprises all establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing 
activities, that is, all establishments classified to sectors 31, 32 and 33 under the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS). Data collected directly from firms’ 
respondents by questionnaires and from administrative files from CRA permit to compile 
financial information such as employment, wages, total cost of materials, total sales of 
manufactured products, inventories, value added by manufacturing and capital 
expenditures. The third linked file comes from administrative data from the Ministry of 
Revenue of Quebec (Revenu Québec) that collects fiscal data from R&D performers 
claiming tax credits located in Quebec or have R&D conducted on their behalf in 
Quebec. Hence, the addition of this file to our dataset allowed us to gather records of the 
                                                 
8 Detailed description of the RDCI survey can be found in the Industrial Research and Development (2002 
Intentions) 
9 Starting from 2004, this survey has been amalgamated to the Annual Survey of Forestry to form the 
Annual Survey of Manufactures and Logging (ASML).  
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amounts of SR&ED or other fiscal incentives to R&D from the government of Québec 
effectively received by firms10. 
For both, the RCDI data survey and the Revenu Québec’s administrative data, the 
reporting unit is the company or enterprise. However, the reporting unit in the case of the 
ASM survey is the establishment. We grouped the establishments in the ASM data file by 
enterprise in the cases of multi-establishments prior to performing the linking of the three 
data file. After matching the three files, discarding cases of firms’ merger and acquisition 
and cleaning outliers in the data, we obtained a sample of 3815 firms with 11 842 
observations of which, 485 cases received both tax credits and R&D grants and, the 
remaining 11 357 cases received tax credits only. However, it should be noted that 
because of the methodological approach adopted, the matching sample used corresponds 
to the years 1998 to 2004 with 3749 firms (11012 observations, of which 410 are treated 
and 10602 are non-treated). Detailed description of this sample is presented in section 
4.1. 
 
3.2. Variables for the estimation of ATT (matching framework) 
3.2.1. Treatment variable  
The treatment variable, denoted gT , is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a 
firm received both R&D tax credits and R&D grants from either the Canadian 
government or from the government of Quebec. In the case where the firm received only 
R&D tax credits from either the Canadian government or from the government of 
Quebec, the treatment variable takes the value of 0. Thus, gT is a binomial variable that 
captures the program participation status of a firm and is, for that, the dependant variable 
in the regression for the estimation of the propensity score. 
 
                                                 
10 Only the information related to SR&ED and other fiscal incentives to R&D from the government of 
Québec was available to us. However, by using official formulas and both, the RCDI data and the 
Revenu Québec’s administrative data, we estimated the amounts of fiscal incentives to R&D received by 
firms from the federal government. This procedure is explained in more details in Baghana, Rufin, and 
Pierre Mohnen, 2009, Effectiveness of R&D tax incentives in small and large enterprises in Québec, 
Small Business Economics 33, 91-107. 
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3.2.2. Selection variables  
We take the variables that influence both the probability, for a firm that receives tax 
credits, of getting an R&D grant (or R&D contract) and the investment in private R&D. 
These selection variables are taken at the beginning of the period prior to the decision to 
participate (or not), that is in our case, the first lag of these variables. As our dataset is 
rich enough, we included most variables often used to estimate this probability11: Firm 
size is widely considered as one of the variables that affect positively this probability and 
the latter is likely higher for larger firms. Indeed, larger firms are less constrained by 
factors such as fixed cost barrier to R&D, the lack of time and human resources necessary 
to follow up technological activities. We use the lagged log of the number of employees 
(
1-t
(l) ) as proxy for the size of the firm. The intensity of capital (
1-t
(k/l) ), constructed as 
the lag of the logarithm of firm’s real assets divided by the number of employees, is 
added to capture the influence of the capital structure in the willingness of firms to 
engage in R&D. The share of technical personnel working in R&D activities (engineers, 
scientists) is a good indicator of firms’ involvement in innovation activities. We therefore 
added a variable constructed as the lagged value of the ratio of firm’s R&D personnel to 
number of employees (
1-t
/L)r(L ). Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) point out the importance 
of also including variables that control for market competition. For that, we use 
respectively, the market share (
1
) −tI(q/q ), constructed as the lagged value of the ratio of 
firm’s real sales to industry’s real sales (at 3-digit NAICS classification) in logarithm and 
the export share (
1
) −tI(e/q ) constructed as the lagged value of the ratio of firm’s real 
exportations to industry’s real sales in logarithm. We include in the regression a country 
of control dummy (FOREIGN) that equals 1 if the country of control of the firm is not 
Canada and 0 otherwise. It is often advanced in the literature that a firm with a foreign 
owned parent company will usually not apply for grants when its demand in R&D is 
adequately supplied by the latter. If this is true for most of the firms owned by a foreign 
                                                 
11 We present only variables retained in the final estimation. Other variables that were not statistically 
significant were discarded in the final estimations. Among these variables are variables often used in the 
literature: age of firm, control variables for market competition such as the concentration ratio or the 
import ratio that captures the competitive pressure of foreign firms on the market (see example Almus, 
Matthias, and Dirk Czarnitzki, 2003, The Effects of Public R&D Subsidies on Firms' Innovation 
Activities: The Case of Eastern Germany, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 21, 226-36. )  
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company, we should expect a negative sign in the coefficient of the dummy FOREIGN. 
We control for technological differences by including twenty dummies ( 201indus − ) to 
take account of the firm specific effects in the twenty one sectors of the NAICS at the 3 
digit code level (see NAICS classification in Table D-5 ). 
 
3.2.3. Outcome variable 
Sometimes referred to as response variables, outcome variables are the outputs of models 
of economic choice such as the model described in section 2.1. The response variable of 
interest in this study is the intensity of R&D constructed as the ratio of firm’s real R&D 
expenditures R to firm’s outputQ . In what follows, we denote it QR / . 
 
 
3.3. Variables entering the production function  
The main variables entering the production function are those appearing explicitly in 
equation ( 2-15 ) described in section 2.2, i.e. the labor productivity growth rate (
t
l)/(qΔ ), 
the capital-labor growth rate (
t
l)/(kΔ ), the R&D intensity induced by private R&D and 
tax credits tQ(R' )/ , the R&D intensity induced by public grants tQ(R" )/ and the 
employment growth rate ( tlΔ ). 
In addition to these variables, we add to the regression other variables in order to control 
the effects of factors not explicitly accounted for. Six indicator variables denoted t1 to t6 
are added to take account of time effects in the study period (1998-2004) and 20 group 
effect dummies as described in the previous section. 
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4.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
4.1. Assessing the input additionality of R&D grants 
To assess the input additionality of R&D subsidies in Quebec, we investigated whether 
public subsidies induce firms in Quebec to spend more on R&D than they would without 
the grants. To do so, we estimated the treatment effect of public grants on firms R&D 
level using the CDiD matching estimator described in section 2.1. Since the choice is 
given to firms by the provincial and federal governments to apply each year for grants in 
addition to the tax credits they are entitled to claim, the treatment effect of public grants 
should also be evaluated each year. Hence, the CDiD matching estimator is applied at 
each period of the matching sample (i.e. from t=1998 to t=2004) and, for the group of 
treated firms, a treatment effect ),( tDiDτ  is obtained for each treated period. The treatment 
effect is not evaluated for the first year of the original sample, i.e. 1997, due to the 
presence of lagged variables in the estimation of the propensity score and also because, 
for each evaluation point, the difference-in-differences estimator requires data for at least 
two periods.  
As another goal of this study is to see how firms of different technological level respond 
to public grants, we also performed matching analysis using two sub-samples of 
technology level breakdown (Low-medium technology and High technology). Table 4-1 
shows the description of the samples used in the matching for the full sample and for the 
two technologies sub-samples. 
 
Table 4-1: Description of the samples used in the matching 
Sample 
All firms Low and medium 
technology 
High technology 
 N1 N0 N1 N0 N1 N0 
1998 58 819 38 726 20 93 
1999 56 886 41 770 15 116 
2000 76 1565 60 1385 16 180 
2001 56 1542 41 1352 15 190 
2002 58 1925 48 1728 10 197 
2003 54 2032 40 1825 14 207 
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2004 52 1833 39 1654 13 179 
Note: N1=Number of treated firms (firms with tax credits + R&D grants) 
N0=Number of non-treated firms (firms with tax credits only) 
 
To obtain the propensity score, for each of the seven periods, we estimated and compared 
several specifications based on probit and on logit models with different set of 
conditioning variables. We ended-up choosing a specification based on a probit model 
with the following conditioning variables: the lagged log number of employees, the 
lagged log capital intensity, the lagged share of R&D personnel, the lagged log market 
share, the lagged log export share and the degree of foreign ownership. This specification 
was clearly superior to the logit model with the same set of covariates since it showed 
better statistical goodness of fit and lower value for the well-known Akaike's Information 
Criterion for selecting among nested econometric models.  
 
Table 4-2 shows the results of probit models for all firms estimated for each year from 
1998 to 2004 with the corresponding sub-sample. The results for the low-medium 
technology firms and for the high technology firms are in Table 4-3 and Table 4-4 
respectively. A look at the three tables reveals that all the probit regression models are 
statistically significant (All firms: LR Chi21998-2004 = [21.35 38.81], P = [0.000 0.002]; 
Low-Medium technology firms: LR Chi21998-2004 = [13.86 30.69], P = [0.000 0.031]; 
High technology firms: LR Chi21998-2004 = [13.95 26.74], P = [0.000 0.030]). On the other 
hand, all the predictor variables in the models in the three samples are statistically 
significant at the 10% level and, across the three samples; they have the same sign at each 
point of time. More specifically, this indicates that the probability to get a subsidy 
increases with the number of employees, the capital intensity and the share of R&D 
personnel and decreases with the market share, the export share and the degree of foreign 
ownership.  
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Table 4-2: Probit estimates for the propensity score estimation (All firms, 1998-2004) 
Parameters/statistics Probit 
 (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) 
        
1-t
(l)  0.351*** 0.196*** 0.289*** 0.376*** 0.346*** 0.430*** 0.322*** 
(0.115) (0.063) (0.086) (0.090) (0.093) (0.088) (0.097) 
1-t
(k/l)  0.167** 0.0805** 0.0910** 0.145* 0.252** 0.154* 0.187* 
(0.071) (0.040) (0.046) (0.077) (0.121) (0.092) (0.107) 
1-t
/L)r(L  
1.221*** 1.406*** 1.655*** 0.386*** 0.266* 1.028*** 0.951*** 
(0.470) (0.459) (0.533) (0.143) (0.144) (0.325) (0.348) 
1
) −tI(q/q  
-0.243** -0.110* -0.252*** -0.195*** -0.165** -0.244*** -0.175** 
(0.098) (0.057) (0.068) (0.064) (0.074) (0.077) (0.084) 
1
) −tI(e/q  
-0.0464** -0.173** -0.0571* -0.178** -0.0824* -0.0336* -0.240* 
(0.023) (0.085) (0.033) (0.074) (0.045) (0.018) (0.132) 
FOREIGN 
-0.619** -0.632** -0.789*** -0.340** -0.313* -0.474*** -0.263* 
(0.286) (0.276) (0.284) (0.150) (0.165) (0.150) (0.150) 
20)indus1(indus
dummies Industry
−  included included included included included included included 
Intercept  -5.400*** -6.047*** -6.223*** -5.977*** -6.953*** -5.668*** -6.406*** 
(1.522) (1.248) (1.357) (1.527) (2.003) (1.851) (1.936) 
Pseudo R2 0.092 0.080 0.081 0.083 0.073 0.090 0.074 
Log likelihood  -141.21 -133.89 -153.67 -185.34 -162.88 -176.74 -172.71 
Number of 
observations 647 662 849 1140 1315 1473 1447 
Notes: *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses unless otherwise indicated. 
Lower case symbol denote the logarithm of the corresponding variable. l :log of number of employees, lk / : capital 
intensity, /LrL : share of R&D personnel, Iqq / : market share, Ie/q : export share, FOREIGN: origin country dummy ( 
Canada=0, Foreign=1), 20indus1indus − : industry dummies. 
 
 25 
 
Table 4-3: Probit estimates for the propensity score estimation (Low-Medium technology 
firms, 1998-2004) 
Parameters/statistics Probit 
 (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) 
        
1-t
(l)  0.307** 0.164** 0.203** 0.304*** 0.283*** 0.388*** 0.177** (0.138) (0.070) (0.084) (0.108) (0.093) (0.104) (0.089) 
1-t
(k/l)  0.183* 0.107** 0.0969* 0.220* 0.143* 0.184* 0.195* (0.097) (0.051) (0.055) (0.126) (0.077) (0.107) (0.100) 
1-t
/L)r(L  
2.193* 1.263** 1.042* 0.346* 0.238* 0.783** 0.999*** 
(1.202) (0.591) (0.596) (0.206) (0.143) (0.377) (0.379) 
1
) −tI(q/q  
-0.274** -0.132** -0.255*** -0.169*** -0.136** -0.262*** -0.155** 
(0.112) (0.066) (0.067) (0.065) (0.066) (0.091) (0.075) 
1
) −tI(e/q  
-0.131* -0.0745* -0.0623* -0.148* -0.120*** -0.0373** -0.389** 
(0.079) (0.044) (0.036) (0.080) (0.038) (0.018) (0.152) 
FOREIGN 
-0.625* -0.402* -0.638* -0.345** -0.325* -0.337* -0.432* 
(0.372) (0.242) (0.360) (0.176) (0.191) (0.187) (0.242) 
20)indus1(indus
dummies Industry
−  included included included included included included included 
Intercept  -6.260*** -5.907*** -5.691*** -6.211*** -2.629** -5.949*** -6.017*** (2.046) (1.129) (1.485) (1.691) (1.300) (2.144) (1.370) 
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.067 0.073 0.065 0.065 0.078 0.089 
Log likelihood  -92.31 -98.31 -121.94 -144.35 -140.26 -138.69 -129.76 
Number of 
observations 
548 564 734 981 1159 1308 1285 
Notes: *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses unless otherwise indicated. 
Lower case symbol denote the logarithm of the corresponding variable. l :log of number of employees, lk / : capital 
intensity, /LrL : share of R&D personnel, Iqq / : market share, Ie/q : export share, FOREIGN: origin country dummy ( 
Canada=0, Foreign=1), 20indus1indus − : industry dummies. 
 
 26 
 
Table 4-4: Probit estimates for the propensity score estimation (High technology, 1998-
2004) 
Parameters/statistics Probit 
 (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) 
        
1-t
(l)  0.430*** 0.308*** 1.231** 0.486** 0.720*** 0.801*** 0.425** (0.133) (0.116) (0.500) (0.210) (0.271) (0.311) (0.173) 
1-t
(k/l)  0.479** 0.243** 0.142* 0.196** 0.952*** 0.623* 0.342* (0.208) (0.107) (0.084) (0.086) (0.360) (0.339) (0.185) 
1-t
/L)r(L  
2.158** 2.512* 3.407** 1.483** 1.317*** 1.160* 1.084* 
(0.941) (1.486) (1.573) (0.682) (0.411) (0.618) (0.630) 
1
) −tI(q/q  
-0.110** -0.265* -0.697* -0.107* -0.441** -0.596** -0.286** 
(0.056) (0.155) (0.378) (0.065) (0.225) (0.253) (0.113) 
1
) −tI(e/q  
-0.106** -0.754** -0.730* -0.249* -0.194* -0.127** -0.453* 
(0.048) (0.380) (0.443) (0.147) (0.118) (0.051) (0.234) 
FOREIGN 
-0.674* -0.781* -0.837** -1.382** -1.332** -1.411*** -0.786** 
(0.357) (0.408) (0.387) (0.659) (0.658) (0.361) (0.358) 
20)indus1(indus
dummies Industry
−  included included included included included included included 
Intercept  -9.651*** -10.95*** -13.71*** -8.474*** -19.61*** -15.06** -9.946*** (3.327) (3.434) (5.083) (2.360) (6.431) (6.251) (3.046) 
Pseudo R2 0.233 0.267 0.273 0.233 0.355 0.239 0.183 
Log likelihood  -36.00 -26.72 -24.69 -34.51 -16.40 -30.74 -32.84 
Number of 
observations 
99 98 115 159 156 165 162 
Notes: *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses unless otherwise indicated. 
Lower case symbol denote the logarithm of the corresponding variable. l :log of number of employees, lk / : capital 
intensity, /LrL : share of R&D personnel, Iqq / : market share, Ie/q : export share, OWN : origin country dummy ( 
Canada=0, Foreign=1), 20indus1indus − : industry dummies. 
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In order to check for the success of the matching in removing differences between the 
group of treated firms (firms with tax credits and grants) and the group of non treated 
firms (firms with tax credits only), one need to check for the balance in the distribution of 
covariates between the two groups before and after performing matching. Matching is 
successful if no significant differences between the means of the two groups remain after 
its application. We first performed the widely used before-after mean comparison t-test in 
the evaluation literature. It consists in carrying out a t-test comparing the means of the 
covariates of the two groups before and after the matching to test whether the means are 
different.The results of this test before the matching and after the matching for the sample 
of all firms are presented in Table B-2 and Table B-3 respectively. Before the matching, 
for all covariates but the share of R&D personnel, there is a significant difference 
between the two groups of means. After the matching, the differences in the means of the 
two groups in all covariates and in the propensity score are no longer significant. 
However, there are still differences in the outcome variable, R&D intensity, as the 
coefficients in all periods are significant at the 5% level. These differences may be 
attributed to the receipt of public R&D grants. 
 
Then we computed, as suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), the standardized 
difference statistic for the covariates of the  two groups before and after the matching 
(results of test for all firms before and after matching in Table B-2 and Table B-3 
respectively). This statistic is the difference of the means of the two groups as a 
percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances of the two groups12. 
The results after the matching, show that standardized differences for all covariates, 
excluding the outcome variable, lie below the 10% threshold, that is, we therefore 
consider that the differences of the means of the two groups for all covariates are no 
longer significant. Indeed, though Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) did not set a rule for the 
statistical significance of the standardized difference statistic, they considered absolute 
                                                 
12 Formally, the standardized difference statistic is a percent given by [ ] 2/1202101 2/)(/)(100 RM ssxx +− , 
where, for each covariate, 1x and Mx0 are the sample means in the treated group and matched control 
group and 21s and 
2
0Rs are the sample variances in the treated group and control reservoir (Rosenbaum, 
Paul R., and Donald B.  Rubin, 1985, Constructing a control group using multivariate matched sampling 
methods that incorporate the propensity score, The American statistician 39, 33-38.) 
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standardized differences below 10% as inconsequential. These results (for both the 
before-after mean comparison t-test and the standardized difference statistic) give us a 
great confidence in the quality of the matching. As an additional balancing test, we 
graphically compared the propensity scores of treated and non-treated groups before and 
after matching. As can be seen in Figure C-1, the results confirm the success of the LLR 
matching estimator in removing differences between both groups. 
 
We performed matching using PSMATCH2 Stata module by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). 
For each of the seven periods, we allowed matching only among treatment and control 
observations pertaining to the same industrial sector using NAICS 3 digit code. Given 
that the seven subsamples for each period are constructed from an unbalanced panel, 
certain firms are observed in more than one cross-section and, in several cases these firms 
switch from the status of treated (Tax credits + R&D grants) to the non-treated status 
(Tax credits only) from a given year to another and vice-versa. If we assume that the 
effect of treatment on a firm last more than one year, then a non-treated firm in a given 
year may not be a reliable match if it had the status of a treated firm in the previous year. 
For this reason and in order to ensure group homogeneity, we imposed an additional 
restriction on each comparison group constructed in the matching for the seven 
subsamples by limiting it only to firms that maintained a status of a non-treated firm in 
any year it is observed along the study period. Additionally, we imposed the common 
support region which consists in dropping treatment observations whose propensity score 
is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity score of the 
observations in the control group. As a consequence, after the matching, the remaining 
observations in the three samples used are as follows: All firms, 7117 observations, 401 
treated and 6716 non-treated; Low-medium technology sample, 6147 observations, 299 
treated and 5848 non-treated; High technology, 876 observations, 99 treated and 876 non-
treated. The weighting function used for the local linear regression matching is the 
triweight or tricube kernel13 and the bandwidth is 0.0814.  
                                                 
13 We also experimented with biweight (quartic) kernel, gaussian kernel and uniform kernel and it did not 
change significantly the results. A good review of weightings functions can be found in Li, Qi, and 
Jeffrey S.  Racine, 2007. Nonparametric Econometrics: Theory and Practice 
 (Princeton University Press). 
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Before turning to the findings from the application of the CDiD estimator, we should note 
that we also performed the CDiD using the Kernel matching estimator, but there were no 
much difference in the estimates reported. This must be caused by the fact that in our data 
there is substantial overlap in the distribution of the propensity score between the 
comparison and treatment groups. Dehejia and Wahba (2002) explain that in such case, 
most of the matching algorithms will yield similar results15. 
 
The findings from the CDiD estimator for all firms and by technology level are reported 
in Table 4-5. Since weighted average outcomes for the non-treated firms enter the LLR 
matching estimator equation (see section 2.1.2), the standard errors reported in the 
matching process for the CDiD coefficients are invalid. To deal with this issue, we 
bootstrapped these standard errors for all the CDiD estimates with 1000 replications. In 
sum, the results show an additionality effect of R&D grants on firms’ private investment 
on R&D. More precisely, the average effect of treatment on R&D intensity for the full 
sample varies between 2% and 11% from 1998 to 2004. For the sub-sample of low-
medium technology firms, which contains more than 86% of the observations of the full 
sample, the results are also quite similar. However, for the sub-sample of high technology 
firms, the CDiD estimates are a bit higher than the ones in the two previous cases, i.e. 
these estimates vary between 4% and 13%. These results suggest the exclusion of 
possible crowding-out effects in a context where firms are given the choice of adding 
R&D grants to R&D tax credits. Furthermore, the results in the case of high technology 
firms suggest that in a fiscal environment such as that of Canada, high technology firms 
may be more responsive than other firms to direct public subsidies. Finally, as can be 
seen in these results, the magnitude of the response decreases between 1998 and 2004 in 
the three cases. Since the differences in the number of subsidized firms are not very 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 We also tested sensitivity of findings to various specifications on bandwidth but did not find significant 
differences. 
15 We find that the results from the LLR matching estimator exhibit significantly less bias error than the 
kernel-based matching estimator. Even though, differences in the estimates of the both matching 
estimators are not very important, the overall comparison shows that LLR matching is the best estimator 
for our data since it is more successful in removing differences between the group of firms with tax 
credits and grants and the group of firms with tax credits only. 
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important in the three samples, we attribute such a decline to the diminution in the value 
of grants observed in Quebec between 1998 and 2004 (see Table 1-1).  
 
Table 4-5: Estimated effect of treatment on R&D intensity based on conditional 
difference-in-differences and local regression matching (bandwidth: 0.08) 
 All firms Low and medium technology High technology 
1998 N1=55, N0=410 N1=37 N0=375 N1=20, N0=90 
0.1122*** 0.1022*** 0.1269*** 
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0021) 
1999 N1=56, N0=477 N1=40 N0=413 N1=14, N0=98 
0.1108*** 0.1001*** 0.1248*** 
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0021) 
2000 N1=73, N0=1063 N1=58 N0=933 N1=15, N0=112 
0.0996*** 0.0979*** 0.1067*** 
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0037) 
2001 N1=55, N0=1014 N1=40, N0=899 N1=15, N0=120 
0.0503*** 0.0407*** 0.0528*** 
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0031) 
2002 N1=58, N0=1270 N1=46, N0=1033 N1=10, N0=118 
0.0500*** 0.0399*** 0.0511*** 
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0036) 
2003 N1=53, N0=1302 N1=40,N0=1116 N1=12, N0=122 
0.0243 0.0201 0.0389*** 
(0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0026) 
2004 N1=51, N0=1180 N1=38 N0=1079 N1=13, N0=117 
0.0245 0.0233 0.0392*** 
(0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0026) 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.  Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses with 
1000 replications. 
 
 
4.2. Assessing the impact of privately and publicly funded R&D on 
productivity growth 
We estimated equation ( 2-15 ) described in section 2.2. For the two components of R&D 
intensity that enter that equation i.e., the R&D intensity induced by R&D expenditures 
funded by R&D grants ( QR" / ) and the R&D intensity induced by private R&D 
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expenditures and by tax credits ( QR' / ), we take the two variables estimated in the 
previous section on matching, respectively DiDQR" τ=/  and DiDYYQR' τ−== 10/ . 
However, these variables should not enter the equation as contemporary variables since 
the effect of a shock on R&D intensity is likely to take a certain time before it is fully 
reflected in firm’s productivity growth. It is often argued that a lag structure of several 
periods should be included in order to account for the adjustment of productivity growth.  
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (1989) survey of the literature relating R&D 
to productivity growth, the productivity gains should lag the R&D outlays by at least one 
year. Hence, we therefore included one-period lagged values of QR" / and QR' / in the 
regression due to relatively small number of observations in the subsample of treated 
firms. 
 
We used value added as proxy for firm’s output Q and we corrected our data to prevent 
bias in the estimates that can arise from double counting as warned by Hall and Mairesse 
(1995). To do so, we respectively subtracted R&D capital16 from the assets and R&D 
personnel from the number of employees in the production function and, added the 
materials component of R&D expenditure into value added. Value added, the capital 
stock and R&D expenditures have been deflated respectively by the industry output price 
deflator at the 3-digit NAICS code, the machinery and equipment price indexes and by 
the Jaffe-Griliches R&D deflator (see Bureau of Labor Statistics (1989) for the latter).  
 
For the estimation procedure, we first performed OLS regression of equation ( 2-15 ) 
with and without time and industry dummies. We also performed the Newey–West two-
step efficient GMM estimation of this equation to allow for the fact that R&D intensity 
components ( QR" / and QR' / ) may be endogenous, i.e. the fact that R&D intensity and 
productivity may be mutually dependent. Indeed, when this hypothesis is verified, OLS 
estimates are biased because the assumption requiring that explanatory variables be 
independent is no longer valid. To correct for this problem, several statistical techniques 
                                                 
16 For details about the construction of this variable, see Baghana, Rufin, and Pierre Mohnen, 2009, 
Effectiveness of R&D tax incentives in small and large enterprises in Québec, Small Business Economics 
33, 91-107.  
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such as indirect least squares, instrumental variable and two- and three-stage least squares 
may be applied. Hence, to verify whether R&D intensity components are endogenous, we 
ran the C or “difference–in–Sargan” test and for the two components, the test rejected the 
null that they are not endogenous regressors in the equations for the two-step GMM 
estimator. This confirmed the need to instrument both QR" / and QR' / . To this end, we 
experimented with several sets of variables and we ended-up using the following set: the 
second and third lagged values of R&D intensity, the lagged value of the share of R&D 
personnel and lagged value of the sum of provincial and federal grants. Table 4-6 shows 
the estimation results of equation ( 2-15 ) estimated by OLS and GMM respectively. It 
should be noted that, for comparison purposes, since the estimation by GMM is 
Heteroscedasticity-consistent (HC), we estimated the OLS using the Huber–White 
sandwich estimator of variance, which is Heteroscedasticity-consistent, in place of the 
traditional calculation. For each case we ran the estimation with and without the dummies 
for time and for industry. For this last part of the analysis, only the larger sample of all 
firms is considered. We excluded the sub-samples of low-medium and high technology 
firms due to the important reduction in the number of observation in the group of treated 
firms after differencing. 
 
Table 4-6: Estimation results of OLS-HC and GMM models for the productivity growth 
(All firms) 
Parameters/statistics OLS-HC  GMM 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
t
l)/(qΔ       
1
)/ −tQ(R"  
-0.154*** -0.156***  0.367*** 0.134* 
(0.038) (0.038)  (0.097) (0.075) 
1
)/ −tQ(R'  
-0.0387* -0.0406*  0.426*** 0.322*** 
(0.023) (0.023)  (0.108) (0.048) 
t
l)/(kΔ  0.112*** 0.110***  0.0385** 0.0971*** (0.014) (0.014)  (0.018) (0.013) 
t
lΔ  -0.198*** -0.200***  -0.0616*** -0.190*** (0.019) (0.019)  (0.022) (0.014) 
)61(
dummies Year
tt −  Not included  Included  Included Not included 
20)indus1(indus
dummies Industry
−  Not included  Included  Included Not included 
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Intercept  0.181 0.263***  0.0667 0.221*** (0.145) (0.031)  (0.068) (0.032) 
F test 
(p-value) 
6.61 34.49  2.16 124.32 
0.000 0.000  0.001 0.000 
Log likelihood -8315.73 -8337.55  -8432.84 -7251.93 
AIC 16687.45 16685.10  16911.68 14513.86 
Test of 
underidentification: 
Kleibergen-Paap rank LM 
statistic 
(p-value) 
   23.92 24.46 
   0.000 0.000 
Test of weak 
identification:  
Cragg-Donald F statistic 
(at 5% level of 
confidence) 
   5.98 6.33 
⎯ IV relative bias 
to OLS 
   Rejected 
>30% 
Rejected 
>20% 
⎯ Size bias    Not rejected >25% 
Rejected 
>25% 
Test of overidentification: 
Hansen J-statistic 
(p-value) 
   3.99 4.10 
   
0.136 0.129 
Number of observations 7406 7406  6071 6316 
Notes: Estimation period is 1998-2004. *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. Standard 
errors in parentheses unless otherwise indicated. Lower case symbol denote the logarithm of the 
corresponding variable. l)/(qΔ : labor productivity growth rate; Q/R' : R&D intensity (induced by private 
R&D expenditures and by tax credits); Q/R" : R&D intensity induced by R&D expenditures funded by 
public grants; l)/(kΔ : capital-labor growth rate; lΔ : employment growth rate. 
 
 
Comparing the estimated models, GMM estimated model 4 is clearly superior and its 
relative lower AIC value (14513.86) among the estimated models adds to this evidence. 
Furthermore, model 4 is the one having the best fit since all the parameters of interest 
(i.e. the coefficient in the two R&D intensity components, in capital labor growth rate 
and in employment growth rate) are significant at the 10% level of confidence. We 
therefore selected model 4 as our preferred model.  
 
We ran several additional tests in order to check for the robustness of the specification of 
the selected model. First, as time and industry dummy variables were individually 
insignificant based on t-tests with very high p values, we proceeded with testing for the 
significance of a subset of coefficients using the Wald test. We could not reject the null 
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that industry dummies, in the one hand, and time dummies, in the other hand, are jointly 
insignificant. In consequence, these dummies were excluded from model 4 
 
To check the relevance of our excluded instruments, we performed the Kleibergen and 
Paap (2006) rank LM statistic test of underidentification which is robust to 
heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation or clustering. The reported statistic of 24.46 falls 
within the region of rejection as the p-value (0.000) strongly reject the null that the 
equation is underidentified at the 1% significance level. We further proceeded with 
testing for the presence of weak instruments since it is well known that even if the 
equation is identified, there may still be weak instrument problems often responsible of 
poor performance of estimators. We further proceeded with testing for the presence of 
weak instruments using the Cragg-Donald F statistic and critical values tabulated by 
Stock and Yogo (2005). At the 5% significance level, the test rejected the null hypothesis 
that the instruments are weak in both alternative definitions offered by Stock and Yogo 
(2005) i.e. first, the bias of the IV estimator, relative to the bias of the OLS, could exceed 
the threshold of 30% and, second, the bias in the size of the Wald test based in the IV 
statistics could exceed 25%. Finally, with a statistic value of 6.33, we fail to reject the 
Hansen J overidentification test, giving us greater confidence that our instrument set is 
relevant. 
 
Regarding the significance of the coefficients, as can be seen, all the coefficients in our 
preferred econometric model (model 4) are significant at the 1% level with an exception 
for the coefficient related to the variable of R&D expenditures funded by public grants 
which is significant at the 10% level. Furthermore, except for the coefficient of 
employment growth that have a negative sign, all the coefficients have a positive sign, 
suggesting a positive effect on labor productivity growth rate. The result for the estimated 
coefficient for the capital-labor growth rate shows a statistically significant role and 
amounts to 0.097, which is quite close to the results reported in the literature. The 
estimated coefficient for the employment growth rate exhibits a negative sign and the t-
test strongly rejects the null hypothesis that it is equal to zero. As pointed in section 2.2, 
this means that constant return to scale is rejected and that firms are facing decreasing 
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return to scale in Quebec. Similar results have been reported by Griliches and Mairesse 
(1991) for US and Japan, Wakelin (2001) for UK, Smith, Dilling-Hansen, Eriksson and 
Madsen (2004) for Denmark and Maté-Garcia and Rodriguez-Fernandez (2008) for 
Spain. 
 
The rates of return to R&D expenditures funded by public grants and to R&D 
expenditures privately funded and by tax credits are respectively 0.134 and 0.322. This 
means that for each additional dollar of public R&D grant, output increases by 0.134 
dollars in the former case and that, for each additional dollar of the remaining R&D 
expenditures (funded privately and by tax credits), output increases by 0.322 dollars. It is 
noteworthy that, although these positive results support direct subsidies programmes, 
they also show that the additional return of direct subsidies is positive but lower than the 
return on the R&D financed by own funds or R&D tax credits. From a comparative point 
of view with the empirical literature, the estimated rates of return of 0.134 and 0.322 are 
consistent with most studies since they fall within the 0.2-0.5 interval of the values 
estimated by these studies. We should note however that this comparison must be taken 
with caution since these studies don’t break R&D spending in various components as in 
the case of this study. The ratio of both rates of return is of 0.42 which indicates that 
public R&D grants represent 42% of the productivity induced by both private funds and 
R&D tax credits. 
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5.  CONCLUSION  
Investigating the effectiveness of public grants as a significant driver in firms’ private 
spending for R&D and the impact of the latter on productivity, have become important 
policy issues in a context of tax credits. Using longitudinal data through the period 1997 
to 2004 from manufacturing firms in Quebec, we analyse these issues in two steps: In the 
first step, we assess the input additionality of public R&D grants in terms of increased 
R&D spending from firms that already receive tax credits and, in the second step, in 
terms of productivity growth. As far we know, this is the first study that integrates these 
issues in one analysis framework by using micro data from Quebec. 
 
Our results show that firms that use public grants for R&D in conjunction with tax credits 
for R&D perform better in terms of R&D input additionality and in terms of growth 
productivity than firms that use only tax credits for R&D. In particular, we find in the 
first step of the study that the R&D intensity of firms in the former group is higher than 
that of firms in the latter group. Our results also support the hypothesis that high-tech 
firms benefit the most from public grants financing. Indeed, we find that the magnitude of 
the impact of R&D grants in the intensity of R&D of high-tech firms is greater than that 
of low and medium technology firms. 
 
In the second step of the study, the first main result is that the rate of return to R&D 
expenditures funded by public R&D grants is of 0.134 i.e. for each additional dollar of 
public R&D grant, output increase by 0.134 dollars. This finding permits to conclude that 
the additional return of direct subsidies is positive but lower than the return on the R&D 
financed by own funds or R&D tax credits. The second main result is that public R&D 
grants represent 42% of the productivity induced by both private funds and R&D tax 
credits. This ratio provides support to the use of public R&D grants as additional policy 
instrument to tax credits. In other words, since R&D grants and R&D tax credits work 
well together, the question for policy makers is less whether to choose between R&D 
grants and R&D tax credits. The question is rather the capacity of the public agency 
responsible of the attribution of R&D grants to identify the projects for which R&D tax 
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credits fail to offer an incentive for the private projects and to find a suitable level of 
additional funding in a context where firms already benefit from fiscal incentives. 
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APPENDICES 
A. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
Table A-1: Variable constructions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Construction Mean S.D. 
L  Firm’s number of employees 111.09 747.65 
l  Firm’s number of employees, in logarithm 3.05 1.61 
K  Tangible assets in real terms, in million 2002 CAN$ 40.00 540.00 
lk /  
Capital intensity, constructed as firm’s real assets 
divided by the number of employees, in logarithm. 
Firm’s real assets is deflated by the machinery and 
equipment price indexes 
11.74 1.17 
/lrl  
Share of R&D personnel, constructed as firm’s R&D 
personnel divided by the number of employees 
0.19 0.27 
q  
Firm’s value added in real terms, in logarithm, 
deflated by the industry output price deflator at the 3-
digit NAICS code 
15.09 1.78 
Iq  
Industry sales in real terms,  
(at 3-digit NAICS classification), in logarithm 
21.74 0.60 
Iqq /  
Market share, constructed as firm’s real sales divided 
by industry’s real sales, in logarithm 
-6.65 1.85 
e  Firm exportations in real terms, in logarithm 14.94 1.72
Ie/q  
Export share, constructed as firm’s real exportations 
divided by industry’s real sales, in logarithm 
-0.13 0.57 
R  R&D expenditures, in million 2002 CAN$ 0.59 6.8 
Q/R  
R&D intensity, constructed as firm’s real R&D 
expenditures divided by firm’s real value added. 
Firm’s real R&D is deflated by the R&D deflator  
0.06 0.11 
)61(
dummies Year
tt −  
6 year dummies:  
t1-t7 for years 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 
and 2004 
  
20)indus1(indus
dummies Industry
−  
20 industry dummies: 
indus1-Indus20 for industries at NAICS 3 digit code 
level: 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 321, 322, 323, 
324, 325, 326, 327, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337 
  
l/q  
Labor productivity, constructed as firm’s real value 
added divided by the number of employees, in 
logarithm.  
12.03 1.17 
l)/(qΔ  
Labor productivity growth rate, constructed as the 
logarithm of the change of the ratio of firm’s real 
value added to the number of employees  
0.02 0.80 
l)/(kΔ  
Capital-labor growth rate, constructed as the 
logarithm of the change of the ratio of firm’s real 
capital to the number of employees  
0.05 0.78 
lΔ  Employment growth rate, constructed as the logarithm of the change of the number of employees 
0.06 0.69 
Note: Lower case symbol denote the logarithm of the corresponding variable. The descriptive statistics are 
sample means for the years 1997-2004. The base year is 2002. Number of observations: 11842 (3815 
firms). 
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B. BALANCING TESTS RESULTS 
Table B-2: Balancing tests before propensity score matching for the Average effect of treatment (ATT) on R&D intensity (All firms) 
Variables / 
Statistics 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
N1=58, N0=819 N1=56, N0=886 N1=76 N0=1565 N1=56 N0=1542 N1=58, N0=1925 N1=54, N0=2032 N1=52, N0=1833 
t-stat Std diff (%) t-stat 
Std 
diff 
(%) 
t-stat 
Std 
diff 
(%) 
t-stat 
Std 
diff 
(%) 
t-stat Std diff (%) t-stat 
Std 
diff 
(%) 
t-stat 
Std 
diff 
(%) 
L  3.768*** 26 4.418*** 29 1.811* 16 1.959* 22 3.016*** 22 5.243*** 25 3.245*** 24 
 0.000   0.000   0.070   0.050   0.003   0.000   0.001   
L/K  6.407*** 34 -1.754* -22 -2.278** -25 1.791* 16 -1.955* -23 7.332*** 39 9.820*** 45 
 0.000   0.080   0.023   0.074   0.051   0.000   0.000   
L/rL  1.421  21 -0.640 -11 0.309  4 0.707  10 0.117  2 2.442** 33 1.567  22 
 0.156   0.522   0.758   0.479   0.907   0.015   0.117   
IQQ /  1.715* 19 2.170** 21 3.002*** 17 2.275** 18 8.695*** 32 9.309*** 33 5.678*** 28 
 0.087   0.030   0.003   0.023   0.000   0.000   0.000   
IE/Q  
-2.288** -26 2.503** 19 3.387*** 15 4.267*** 23 1.833* 11 -3.038*** -36 3.930*** 19 
 0.022   0.012   0.001   0.000   0.067   0.002   0.000   
FOREIGN -3.034*** -32 -2.481** -27 -1.972** -19 -1.670* -18 -2.878*** -26 -1.786* -18 -1.989** -19 
 0.002   0.013   0.049   0.095   0.004   0.074   0.047   
PSCORE  6.768*** 71 4.385*** 50 3.526*** 54 5.856*** 45 6.577*** 54 7.359*** 59 7.496*** 66 
 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
Q/R  3.059*** 35 2.829*** 32 8.143*** 60 4.889*** 45 2.674*** 31 7.025*** 57 2.161** 29 
 0.002   0.005   0.000   0.000   0.008   0.000   0.031   
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses unless otherwise indicated. The descriptive statistics are sample means 
for the years 1998-2004. The base year is 2002. L : number of employees, K/L : capital intensity, /LrL : share of R&D personnel, IQ/Q : market share, 
IE/Q : export share, OWN : origin country dummy (Canada=0, Foreign=1), PSCORE : propensity score, Q/R : R&D intensity 
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Table B-3: Balancing tests after propensity score matching for the Average effect of treatment (ATT) on R&D intensity (All firms) 
Variables / 
Statistics 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
N1=55, N0=410 N1=56, N0=477 N1=73 N0=1063 N1=55 N0=1014 N1=58, N0=1270 N1=53, N0=1302 N1=51, N0=1180 
t-stat Std diff (%) t-stat 
Std diff 
(%) t-stat 
Std diff 
(%) t-stat 
Std diff 
(%) t-stat 
Std diff 
(%) t-stat 
Std diff 
(%) t-stat 
Std diff 
(%) 
L  0.350  3 -0.275 -3 1.551  3 -0.516 -25 0.540  5 0.885  5 0.037  1 
 0.727   0.784   0.125   0.607   0.591   0.380   0.970   
L/K  -0.945  -116 -0.536 -25 -0.965 -28 0.806  9 -0.277 -7 0.870  9 -0.134 -7 
 0.348   0.594   0.338   0.423   0.783   0.388   0.894   
L/rL  -0.933  -27 1.212  7 -0.614 -5 0.358  8 -0.938 -20 0.305  7 1.518  9 
 0.354   0.230   0.541   0.721   0.352   0.761   0.134   
IQ/Q  
0.419  8 -0.104 -3 1.515  7 0.307  8 1.221  6 1.006  5 0.955  8 
 0.677   0.918   0.134   0.760   0.227   0.319   0.343   
IE/Q  
-0.924  -21 1.472  4 1.440  0 1.478  4 -0.067 -1 -1.144 -19 0.505  8 
 0.359   0.146   0.154   0.143   0.947   0.257   0.616   
FOREIGN -0.745  -20 0.000  0 0.000  0 0.225  6 0.000  0 -0.501 -34 0.736  9 
 0.459   1.000   1.000   0.823   1.000   0.618   0.465   
PSCORE  0.225  4 0.051  1 0.216  6 0.053  1 0.161  4 0.165  3 0.512  8 
 0.822   0.959   0.830   0.958   0.872   0.870   0.610   
Q/R  1.835* 45 1.875* 46 1.728* 29 1.913* 45 1.751* 25 1.961* 44 1.739* 41 
 0.071   0.066   0.088   0.059   0.085   0.055   0.087   
Note: *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. Standard errors in parentheses unless otherwise indicated. The descriptive statistics are sample means 
for the years 1998-2004. The base year is 2002. L : number of employees, K/L : capital intensity, /LrL : share of R&D personnel, IQ/Q : market share, 
IE/Q : export share, OWN : origin country dummy (Canada=0, Foreign=1), PSCORE : propensity score, Q/R : R&D intensity. 
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C. DISTRIBUTION OF PROPENSITY SCORE 
Figure C-1: Distribution of propensity score before and after matching – 1998-2004, All 
firms 
Distribution of propensity score before and after matching – 1998-2004, All firms 
 BEFORE AFTER 
1998 
0
5
10
15
20
D
en
si
ty
0 .2 .4 .6
Propensity score
Tax Credits only
Tax Credits + R&D grants
1998 - Before matching
 
0
2
4
6
8
D
en
si
ty
0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25
Propensity score
1998 - After matching
 
1999 
0
5
10
15
D
en
si
ty
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Propensity score
1999 - Before matching
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
D
en
si
ty
0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25
Propensity score
1999 - After matching
 
2000 
0
5
10
15
D
en
si
ty
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Propensity score
2000 - Before matching
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
D
en
si
ty
0 .05 .1 .15 .2
Propensity score
2000 - After matching
 
 46 
2001 
0
5
10
15
20
D
en
si
ty
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Propensity score
2001 - Before matching
 
0
2
4
6
8
D
en
si
ty
0 .1 .2 .3
Propensity score
2001 - After matching
 
2002 
0
10
20
30
40
D
en
si
ty
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Propensity score
2002 - Before matching
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
D
en
si
ty
0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25
Propensity score
2002 - After matching
 
2003 
0
10
20
30
40
D
en
si
ty
0 .2 .4 .6
Propensity score
2003 - Before matching
 
0
5
10
15
20
D
en
si
ty
0 .05 .1 .15 .2
Propensity score
2003 - After matching
 
2004 
0
10
20
30
40
D
en
si
ty
0 .1 .2 .3
Propensity score
2004 - Before matching
 
2
4
6
8
10
12
D
en
si
ty
0 .05 .1 .15 .2
Propensity score
2004 - After matching
 
 47 
D. CLASSIFICATION OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
Table D-4: OECD Classification of Manufacturing Industries Based on Technology 
using ISIC* rev.3 activity breakdown 
  
ISIC rev.3 
code 
1 High-technology industries  
 Aircraft and spacecraft  353
 Pharmaceuticals  2423
 Office, accounting and computing machinery 30
 Radio, TV and communciations equipment  32
 Medical, precision and optical instruments  33
   
2 Medium-high-technology industries  
 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c.  31
 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  34
 Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals  24 excl. 2423 
 Railroad equipment and transport equipment, n.e.c.  352 + 359 
 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.  29
   
3 Medium-low-technology industries  
 Building and repairing of ships and boats  351
 Rubber and plastics products  25
 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel  23
 Other non-metallic mineral products  26
 Basic metals and fabricated metal products  27-28 
   
4 Low-technology industries  
 Manufacturing, n.e.c.; Recycling  36-37 
 Wood, pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing  20-22
 Food products, beverages and tobacco  15-16 
 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear  17-19
  
*ISIC: International Standard Industrial Classification  
Source: OECD, 2005  
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Table D-5: Classification of Manufacturing Industries Based on the type of activity using 
NAICS* 3 digit code breakdown 
Dummy  
NAICS 3 digit 
code 
Indus 01 Food Manufacturing 311 
Indus 02 Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing 312 
Indus 03 Textile Mills 313 
Indus 04 Textile Product Mills 314 
Indus 05 Clothing Manufacturing 315 
Indus 06 Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing 316 
Indus 07 Wood Product Manufacturing 321 
Indus 08 Paper Manufacturing 322 
Indus 09 Printing and Related Support Activities 323 
Indus 10 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing 324 
Indus 11 Chemical Manufacturing 325 
Indus 12 Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing 326 
Indus 13 Non-Metallic Mineral Product Manufacturing 327 
Indus 14 Primary Metal Manufacturing 331 
Indus 15 Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing 332 
Indus 16 Machinery Manufacturing 333 
Indus 17 Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing 334 
Indus 18 Electrical Equipment, Appliance and Component Manufacturing 335 
Indus 19 Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 336 
Indus 20 Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing 337 
Indus 21 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 339 
  
*NAICS: North American Industry Classification System 
Source: Statistics Canada  
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E. DERIVATION OF THE LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY EQUATION 
Consider a typical a Cobb-Douglas production function given by: 
 
itt eSSLKAeQ ititititit
εγγβαλ "' "'=  ( 5-1 )
 
where: 
i = firms; 
t = years; 
Q = output; 
A = constant; 
λ = scale factor measuring the rate of disembodied technical change; 
α = elasticity of output with respect to physical capital; 
β = elasticity of output with respect to labour; 
'γ = elasticity of output with respect to knowledge capital induced by private R&D and 
by tax credits; 
'γ = he elasticity of output with respect to knowledge capital induced by public grants; 
K =  physical capital; 
L =  labour; 
'S  = share of knowledge capital induced by R&D expenditures funded privately and by 
tax credits; 
"S =  share of knowledge capital induced by R&D expenditures funded by public 
grants; 
ε = error term. 
 
If we take the logarithm and subtract both sides of equation ( 5-1 ) by the logarithm of 
labour, we get: 
itititititititit lsslktalq εγγβαλ +++++++=− ""''  ( 5-2 )
 
By assuming that the constant returns to scale coefficient is given by 1−+= βαθ , this 
measure should equal zero in the case of constant return to scale. However, if this 
measure is less than zero or greater than zero, then increasing return to scale and 
decreasing return to scale will be assumed respectively. If we substitute αθβ −+= 1  into 
equation ( 5-2 ) and re-order terms, we get the following expression:  
 
ititititititit ssllktalq εγγθαλ ++++−++=− ""'')(  ( 5-3 )
First-differencing ( 5-3 ) yields the following: 
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itititititit ssllklq εγγθαλ +Δ+Δ+Δ+−Δ+=−Δ ""'')()(  ( 5-4 )
 
Since, in the first step of the study, we used the capital intensity as a proxy for the 
knowledge capital, we need to transform equation ( 5-4 ) in a way such that it includes 
capital intensity in its functional form instead of knowledge capital. This is done by using 
the usual relation linking the output elasticity with regard to knowledge capital to the rate 
of return, which is: 
 ( )
itQ
Sργ =  ( 5-5 )
 
where ρ is the rate of return, and by assuming that the growth rate of the knowledge 
capital is given by: 
 ( )itSSits ∂=Δ  ( 5-6 )
 
Equations ( 5-5 ) and ( 5-6 ) give: 
 ( ) ( )itSSitQSits ∂=Δ ργ  ( 5-7 )
 
The change in the knowledge capital S∂  may be approximated by current R&D 
expenditures R  if we assume that there is no depreciation in the knowledge capital. Then 
we can write that ( )
itQ
R
its '''' ργ =Δ  and ( )itQRits "'"" ργ =Δ , and by substituting these 
expressions into equation ( 5-4 ) we get the labour productivity growth as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ititQRitQRitititit llklq υρρθαλ +++Δ+−Δ+=−Δ "' "')()(  ( 5-8 )
 
It is worth mentioning that equation ( 5-8 ) in which the main parameter of interest is the 
rate of return ρ  has been widely used in the literature as an alternative to equation ( 5-4 ) 
in which the parameter of interest is instead the elasticity γ . This has been particularly 
the case because of the lack of data to construct the knowledge capital variable. 
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